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Health Insurance, Employment, and the Human Genome: 
Genetic Discrimination and Biobanks in the United States 
 
 
Eric A. Feldman∗ 
Chelsea Darnell∗∗ 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Does genetic information warrant special legal protection, and if so how should it be 
protected?1 This question has taken on greater urgency in the United States as genetic testing has 
become more common and biobanks have developed repositories for large amounts of genetic 
information. One central concern raised by the collection and storage of genetic and biomedical 
information is that individuals will increasingly experience privacy violations and 
discrimination.2 Biomedical researchers worry that public fear of discrimination and privacy 
violations will limit their ability to collect and analyze genetic information in biobanks. As 
genetic testing advances and biobanks grow, such concerns will be amplified. The possibility 
that fear of genetic discrimination would cause people to refrain from genetic testing, which 
would in turn inhibit scientific research and the discovery of potentially life-saving medical 
interventions, was in large part responsible for the passage of legislation that addresses the 
potential threat of genetic discrimination in the US.  
This essay examines the most recent (and indeed only) significant effort by the US 
government to prohibit genetic discrimination, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA). Advocates worked for more than a decade to secure GINA’s passage. In the end, we 
argue that the legislation is unlikely to have the positive impact sought by advocates of genetic 
privacy. In part, GINA disappoints because it does too little. Hailed by its promoters as “the first 
civil rights act of the 21st century,” GINA’s reach is in fact quite modest and its grasp even more 
so. But GINA also fails by trying to do too much, tying the hands of insurers and employers in 
ways that may fail to serve the interests of individuals or society more generally. In short, if 
genetic discrimination is a problem that needs to be solved, GINA is not the solution. Instead, the 
Act creates a number of new and possibly intractable problems that may be more troublesome 
than what it originally set out to resolve. 
 
 
7.2 History of the Bill 
 
GINA was signed into law on May 21, 2008, thirteen years after it was originally introduced 
in the House of Representatives. For a bill that floundered for over a decade, the vote in 
Congress was overwhelmingly positive; 94-0 in the Senate and 414-1 in the House. The lone 
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1 See Eric A. Feldman, “The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA): Public Policy and Medical 
Practice in the Age of Personalized Medicine,” 27 Journal of General Internal Medicine 743, 2012, for a discussion 
of the implications of GINA for primary care providers. 
2 Kaufman et al. 2009, p. 643-644 
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dissenter was Ron Paul, the maverick Texas Republican who opposes all legislation that he sees 
as expanding the federal government. The first version of GINA was introduced in 1995 by 
Representative Louise Slaughter, a Democrat from New York with a background in 
microbiology and public health. Despite bipartisan support, a series of efforts by Representative 
Slaughter and Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and broad public support for the bill,3 GINA 
encountered various impediments. On the brink of passage in 2007, for example, GINA was 
stalled by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), an obstetrician who was concerned that it would 
encourage frivolous suits.4 In March 2008, he and ten Senators signed a letter to the White House 
requesting amendments. The lawmakers then agreed to create a “'firewall” between employment 
and insurance sector regulation (so that a person could not sue both a group health plan and the 
employer for the same violation), and insert a clarification that insurers can continue to base 
decisions on an existing/expressed disease.”5 With those amendments, GINA finally became law.   
 
7.3 GINA: Content of the Act: 
 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) is divided into two sections.  The 
first, Title I, prohibits insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic information while the 
second, Title II, does the same for employers. Title I of GINA applies to insurers in three basic 
ways: (1) group health insurers are prohibited from using genetic information about an individual 
to adjust group premium plans and insurers offering individual plans are prohibited from using 
genetic information to deny coverage, adjust premiums, or impose preexisting condition 
exclusion; (2) health insurers are not allowed to require or request genetic testing; and (3) health 
insurers are prohibited from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information for 
underwriting purposes. Nothing in GINA, however, prevents group or individual insurers from 
considering manifested conditions for underwriting purposes. Insurers that do not comply with 
GINA are fined $100 per day for each violation; the minimum penalty is $2,500 (escalated to 
$15,000 if the violation is more than de minimis). 
Title II of GINA contains provisions related to employers with 15 or more employees.  
GINA aims only to isolate the treatment of genetic information by employers and does nothing 
to alter pre-existing regulations on the eligibility and use of health information by employers in 
federal and state law. Title II of GINA makes it illegal for an employer with more than 15 
employees to discriminate with respect to hiring, compensation, terms, conditions or other 
privileges of employment because of genetic information.  Employers are not allowed to 
“request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or family 
member.” Title II is enforced under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows 
employees to recover up to $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. If an employer 
intentionally violates GINA, a court can enjoin the employer from engaging in the practice and 
order affirmative action, such as the reinstatement or hiring of employees. 
GINA’s broad definitions of the terms “family member,” “genetic information,” and 
“genetic test” mean that the Act prohibits insurers and employers from engaging in a wide array 
                                                            
3 “Besides the more than 200 health advocacy and business organizations that support this bill, recent surveys show 
93 percent of Americans believe that employers and insurers should not be able to use genetic information to 
discriminate.” 153 Cong. Rec. H 4083, 4096 (Apr. 25 2007) (statement of Judy Biggert (R-IL13)). 
4 Ironically, Senator Coburn’s official website press room reproduces a story critical of his hold-out period. See 
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=LatestNews.NewsStories&ContentRecord_id=9180ab87-
802a-23ad-4e03-b65e171db230&Issue_id= 
5 MacKenna 2008  
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of activities. Genetic information is defined as “information about [an] individual’s genetic tests, 
the genetic tests of family members of [the] individual, and the manifestation of a disease or 
disorder in the family member of [the] individual.” Family member is also defined broadly to 
encompass any dependent or relative up to the fourth degree. These broad definitions mean that 
there is a significant amount of information which employers and insurers are prohibited from 
using. The term genetic test is defined in both Title I and II as “an analysis of human DNA, 
RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal 
changes.” There is, however, a slight difference between the definitions of genetic test in Title I 
and Title II. Title I includes an exception for tests that are directly related to a “manifested 
disease, disorder, or pathological condition.” In making this distinction, lawmakers recognized 
that “there are important and necessary uses for non-genetic health information in the health 
insurance setting that are not applicable in the employment context.”6 
 
 
7.4 The Case for GINA   
 
Given the existence of both federal and state anti-discrimination laws, and the thin evidence 
that genetic discrimination is currently practiced, proponents of GINA struggled to justify the 
need for new legislation targeting genetic discrimination.7 In building their case, they largely 
relied on the historical case of discrimination against carriers of sickle cell anemia and anecdotal 
evidence of isolated instances of genetic discrimination as proof that GINA was needed. Sickle 
cell was their most powerful example. During the 1970s state governments began to screen and 
identify carriers of sickle cell anemia, a disease which afflicts African-Americans. The goal was 
to identify not only individuals suffering from the disease, but also healthy carriers. Genetic 
testing for sickle cell was justified by claims that those with the sickle cell gene might be hyper-
susceptible to certain workplace toxins, even though such claims lacked empirical support.8 The 
discrimination (by both insurers and employers) that resulted from screening for sickle cell 
anemia was exacerbated when “state legislatures began to take steps in the area, and in the early 
1970s began mandating genetic screening of all African-Americans for sickle cell anemia, 
leading to further fear and discrimination.”9 In response, “Congress in 1972 passed the National 
Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, which withholds Federal funding from States unless sickle cell 
testing is voluntary.”10  
In addition to the case of discrimination against carriers of sickle cell anemia, proponents of 
GINA presented anecdotal evidence of more recent instances of genetic discrimination.  
Representative Slaughter recounted the tale of Heidi Williams, who in 2004 testified that a large 
health insurance company had denied coverage for her two children because they were carriers 
of the gene for alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency. Slaughter argued that “GINA will make these 
discriminatory practices illegal by prohibiting health insurers from denying coverage or charging 
higher premiums to a healthy individual because of a genetic predisposition, which means [they] 
                                                            
6 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 28.  
7 Existing legislation includes, for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and a large number of state statues that prohibit genetic 
discrimination by insurers and employers in at least some contexts.  
8 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 8 (citing Melinda B. Kaufmann, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: An Overview of 
Existing Protections, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.393, 402–03 (1999)) 
9 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300(b)). 
10 Ibid. 
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may never get the disease.”11  Isolated anecdotal instances of alleged genetic discrimination and 
a historical case of genetic discrimination that has already been addressed by Congress were the 
bedrock of the argument for GINA. But they offered only weak evidence that genetic 
discrimination is occurring or that government action is necessary.   
To justify Title II of GINA, proponents relied primarily on surveys indicating that genetic 
discrimination may be occurring in the workplace.  The American Management Association 
conducted a “Workplace Testing Survey” in 2000 and found there were several instances in 
which members used what they understood to be genetic information in hiring and firing 
decisions.12 Of 2,133 employers included in another survey, seven indicated that their companies 
performed what they thought was genetic testing of employees (that number was up from three 
in 1999).  Of the seven, three reported performing genetic testing of job applicants and six 
reported performing genetic testing of employees. The Office of Technology Assessment 
conducted a similar survey in 1989 of Fortune 500 companies; of the 330 companies that 
responded, 12 admitted to conducting genetic tests of employees.13 
Given the scant evidence of genetic discrimination, proponents had little choice but to emphasize 
the possibility of future discrimination rather than actual instances of discrimination. They 
pointed to the large number of genetic disorders and the millions of people affected to conclude 
that genetic discrimination could affect everyone. In arguing for passage of GINA, 
Representative Slaughter stated that “Already, over 15,500 recognized genetic disorders affect 
13 million Americans, and . . .  each and every one of us is in that category of carrying between 5 
and 50 bad genes, or predicted genes.”14 Moreover, supporters of GINA argued that regardless of 
whether there is currently widespread genetic discrimination, fear of discrimination could 
dampen research efforts and inhibit scientific progress. This was emphasized by the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), which published a report on 
genetic discrimination in 2007 finding that fear of discrimination is the most common reason for 
not participating in research on potentially lifesaving genetic testing for breast cancer and colon 
cancer. According to the report, more than one third of those who were eligible declined to 
participate in a genetic testing program; those who declined cited fears about the potential effect 
of test results on their health insurance coverage as the primary reason for their refusal.15 In the 
end, given the lack of evidence that genetic discrimination is currently a significant problem, 
GINA’s primary target appears to be the fear that genetic discrimination could become a serious 
issue in the future.  
 
7.5  The Case Against GINA: 
 
 
7.5.1 Criticisms of Title I 
 
No one advocates genetic discrimination, and no politician wants to be seen as favoring the 
mistreatment of the genetically vulnerable. But Congress’s overwhelming support of GINA 
should not mask the various deficiencies of the legislation. Most significantly, GINA is a 
                                                            
11 Id. at 4095.  
12 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 6. 
13 Id. at 7.  
14 153 Cong. Rec. H 4083, 4095 (Apr. 25 2007) (statement of Louise Slaughter (D-NY28)). 
15 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 5. See also Rothenberg 2007 
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response to an imaginary need—there is little evidence of genetic discrimination in the United 
States, and similarly little evidence that GINA will lead to increased participation in clinical 
research or a greater willingness among patients to pursue genetic testing. Proponents of the Act 
pointed to anecdotal evidence of discrimination and recounted discrimination against carriers of 
sickle cell anemia in the 1970s. Beyond that, there is scant evidence of actual genetic 
discrimination occurring in the United States. According to the Senate HELP Committee, for 
example, “[a]lthough surveys and polls demonstrate a fairly widespread fear of discrimination, 
there is little evidence or documentation of actual discrimination in health insurance. For 
instance, the American Academy of Actuaries notes that private insurers do not require 
applicants for insurance to undergo genetic testing or use genetic tests to limit coverage for 
preexisting conditions.”16 Noting “the apparent conflict between actual discrimination versus the 
fear or perception of discrimination,” the Senate HELP Committee nevertheless found the Act 
necessary to assuage (irrationally) worried consumers.17  
In addition to prohibiting a type of discrimination that rarely if ever occurs, GINA represents 
an incomplete and flawed solution to the hypothetical problems it addresses. The Act prohibits 
discrimination only by a limited class of insurers, health insurers. It does not prohibit 
discrimination in other insurance contexts, notably life insurance, disability insurance, and long-
term care insurance. The implication of such a limitation is that it is appropriate for insurers to 
use genetic information when writing insurance policies that do not fall within the scope of the 
Act.  If the use of genetic information by the insurance industry is discriminatory in the health 
insurance area, so too would it be discriminatory vis a vis life insurance, and GINA should 
prohibit all insurers from using genetic information, not only a narrow subset of insurers.18   
Even with regard to health insurance, GINA’s applicability is relatively limited.  Most 
Americans with health insurance are covered by a group plan provided by their employer, with 
only 9% of Americans purchasing health insurance privately.19 When insurance companies price 
group plans, they evaluate the overall health characteristics (and claims history) of the group and 
set uniform premiums. Individual members of the group all pay the same amount for their health 
insurance.20 Consequently, at least when it comes to group health plans, there is little opportunity 
for discrimination against individuals on the basis of genetic information. In the absence of 
GINA, insurers could raise rates for an entire group as the result of an individual’s genetic 
information, thus raising the possibility of discrimination against all members of the group. But 
such actions do not appear to have occurred in the past, and are highly unlikely to happen in the 
future, given the extremely ambiguous link between genetic information and increased health 
care costs. Thus, even in the field of health insurance, where GINA appears to boldly prohibit 
genetic discrimination, the applicability of the Act is limited by the fact that the insurers through 
which most Americans obtain their health insurance are unlikely to be in a position to use genetic 
                                                            
16 S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 7. “Another study of insurance practices found there are almost no well-documented cases 
of health insurers either asking for or using presymptomatic genetic test results in their underwriting decisions. The 
same study found that ‘some insurers clearly do use family history information for important disease categories such 
as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes, but they do so only to look for or evaluate other signs of existing or prior 
disease, not to predict the onset of future health problems.’” Id. at 8.  
17 Id. at 8.  
18 It is not clear why GINA did not prohibit all insurers from using genetic information. One possibility is that the 
politically powerful life insurance industry would have effectively opposed such legislation. 
19 DeNavas et al. 2008  
20 Because the insurance industry is heavily regulated by state governments, there is significant variation in how 
companies engage in community rating and experience rating when setting health insurance premiums.  
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information in a discriminatory manner.   
The most challenging question raised by GINA is whether the use of genetic information by 
insurers should be condemned as inappropriately discriminatory.  Determining what constitutes 
discrimination is always contentious, but within the insurance industry that job has been made 
easier by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). NAIC’s Model Unfair 
Trade Practices Act prohibits “making or permitting any unfair discrimination between 
individuals of the same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium, 
policy fees or rates charged…”21 Under this definition, for example, it is clear that it would be 
unfairly discriminatory to price health insurance differently for two people if they both presented 
identical risk profiles. It would not, however, be unfairly discriminatory to price one of their 
insurance policies higher if one of them had suffered two heart attacks and the other had a 
healthy heart. It would also be unfairly discriminatory to price insurance differently for two 
people if they both tested positive for a gene connected to breast cancer and were the same in all 
other respects, but not unfairly discriminatory to price insurance differently if one of the 
individuals tested positive for the gene and the other did not. As long as there is a reasonable 
basis for believing that testing positive for a particular gene can have an impact on someone’s 
long term health profile and corresponding health care costs, then under the insurance industry’s 
definition of discrimination it does not appear as though pricing insurance plans differently based 
on genetic information would be unfairly discriminatory.22   
Since its inception, classifying risk and making distinctions between individuals based on their 
risk profiles has been the lifeblood of the insurance industry. Evaluating individuals based on the 
risks they present, and distinguishing between individuals based upon their different risk profiles, 
should be considered discriminatory only when the basis of such distinctions is inappropriate. 
Insurers have long taken into account gender, medical history, weight, alcohol consumption, and 
smoking, for example, when evaluating an individual’s future health trajectory. Such information 
may be useful for determining different health risks and potential costs of providing health care 
treatment. If fine grained genetic tests provided accurate information about individual 
proclivities to certain medical conditions, then using that information in insurance coverage 
decisions may not run afoul of the notion of unfair discrimination in the insurance industry, or 
perhaps of broader societal views of discrimination. Higher risk individuals end up consuming 
more insurance than lower risk individuals; when insurers are able to determine which 
individuals pose a higher risk then they will charge those individuals a higher premium to 
compensate for the fact that they are likely to use more insurance in the future. Indeed, some 
European nations that enacted genetic discrimination legislation earlier than the US have found 
that legal prohibitions on genetic discrimination have increased the degree to which insurers 
factor ‘lifestyle’ risks into their underwriting practices. The result is that people who smoke, or 
are obese, or present other types of lifestyle risks, face greater levels of discrimination (which are 
generally manifested as higher insurance premiums) than before the passage of legislation 
prohibiting genetic discrimination.23 
                                                            
21 ... 
22See Tom Baker, ed., Insurance Law and Policy, section re: “Topics in Substantive Insurance Regulation,” 
subsection “Insurance Risk Classification,” [FIND PRECISE CITE], for a discussion of risk classification and fair 
discrimination: “As understood by many people in the insurance business, classifying people according to their risk 
is fair and gives them an incentive to arrange their affairs so that they pose a lower risk.”(p.748?)  In other words, 
insurers believe that it is fair for people to pay more for insurance if they present higher risks, but unfair to charge 
people different premiums if they are of the same class and represent the same hazards. 
23 Van Hoyweghen and Horstman 2008 
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If insurers cannot collect the information necessary to evaluate individual risk profiles, 
then they will raise all premiums and lower risk individuals will end up subsidizing higher risk 
individuals. According to the prevailing values of the US insurance industry and its embrace of 
experience rating, the greatest injustice occurs when insurers do not use all available information 
(including genetic information if it is a reliably predictive indicator of an individual’s risk 
potential) to distinguish between the insured population, and lower risk individuals are charged 
the same amount as higher risk individuals.  Such an approach to insurance runs the risk of 
adverse selection, making it less likely for low risk than high risk individuals to buy insurance, 
and increasing the average risk of those in the pool.24  
If one were to object to experience rating and challenge the usual insurance industry 
practice of treating individuals differently on the basis of the future risks that they pose, then the 
distinction that GINA draws between genetic information and manifested diseases becomes 
suspect. Korobkin and Rajkumar argue in The New England Journal of Medicine that a person 
whose colonoscopy finds an actual disease (a manifested condition not protected by GINA) bears 
“no more responsibility” for their increased risk of future treatment than those whose genes 
predispose them to illness (a genetic predisposition protected by GINA).25  GINA further 
complicates the problem: “Because insurance companies may no longer make use of clearly 
relevant information such as family history in their risk assessment, they will rely even more 
heavily on current health status when setting rates, even when it has only slight value in 
predicting future illness. In a post-GINA world, not only will the very sick have even more 
trouble obtaining affordable insurance, but so will the mostly well. Additionally, while those who 
get bad news from genetic tests will rely on GINA to obtain health insurance at a subsidized rate, 
those whose genes put them at lower risk can opt out entirely or, more likely, purchase insurance 
with higher deductibles, greater cost sharing, and more exclusions. If the lower-risk portion of the 
population segregates itself into what is essentially a separate insurance pool, the goal of 
spreading the cost of genetic risk cannot be satisfied”.26  
One response to this challenge is to abandon the regulatory efforts of GINA and leave 
health insurance to market forces. Given the recent passage of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, however, it appears that the US health insurance industry is likely to more 
heavily regulated in future, not less, Another response, embraced by Korobkin and Rajkumar, is 
to admit that the distinction between genetic information and other immutable characteristics is 
arbitrary and to move toward a system that prohibits insurance companies from taking into 
account any health information, not just genetic information for underwriting policies. This 
would create one large community rate, with the only difference in premiums being driven by 
those circumstances within a person’s reasonable control.27 
In addition to the conceptual challenges of collecting and evaluating individual genetic 
information, there is also a practical concern. As of 2011, genetic information is not usefully 
predictive of health outcomes. Testing can reveal the existence of specific genes in an 
individual’s DNA, but scientists are not able to make useful predictions about the increased 
likelihood that a particular individual will end up manifesting a particular condition. Moreover, 
genetic testing is only available for a limited number of the many diseases that affect humankind. 
                                                            
24 As the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 is implemented, some of these issues will lose their 
salience.  
25 Korobkin and Rajkumar 2008 
26 Id. at 336 
27 Id. at 337.  
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Since the use of genetic information is not usefully predictive of future health outcomes, 
companies that rely on genetic information are at a competitive disadvantage. For that reason, at 
least currently, health insurers have little practical use for genetic information. Even if a 
company chose to ignore the economic irrationality of collecting and using genetic information 
in underwriting decisions, individuals who believed they had suffered from genetic 
discrimination would be able to pursue their claims under one of several already-existing federal 
or state laws. GINA provides few if any new useful legal tools to potential plaintiffs.     
 
7.5.2 Criticisms of Title II 
 
Although employment discrimination is intolerable, matching people’s skills, abilities, 
and qualifications to particular jobs is the lifeblood of human resources departments throughout 
the nation. For a commercial airline hiring pilots, for example, it is critical that potential 
employees not only have technical knowledge about how to fly a plane, but also have good 
reflexes, react well under pressure, and be in good physical condition. It would certainly be 
undesirable to have pilots who were particularly susceptible to sudden and unpredictable seizures 
or who suffered from narcolepsy. A recent study by Japanese researchers raises challenging 
questions about the use of genetic information in the employment setting. According to that 
study, there is a genetic variant that is linked to a much higher than average risk of narcolepsy.28 
In addition, scientists have identified at least twelve forms of epilepsy with a genetic basis.29 If 
science progresses to the point that genetic tests can provide scientifically reliable information 
about whether a given individual has the gene for narcolepsy or epilepsy, and can accurately 
predict the likelihood that the condition would manifest within a given amount of time, should 
airlines ignore that information when they hire pilots? Should they use it to screen out particular 
employees?  
These are challenging questions, ethically and legally. But at least in contexts like 
commercial aviation, erring on the side of caution is the most appropriate response. When 
boarding a plane, people should know that the airline has examined all relevant, reliable, and 
available information to ensure that the pilot is not likely to have a seizure or a narcoleptic attack 
during the flight. That includes ambiguous but suggestive information from genetic tests, as well 
as information about an applicant’s family history. GINA prohibits airlines from gathering and 
using both types of information in their hiring decisions. Of course, if science has not progressed 
to the point of being able to identify a relevant genetic variant, or provide useful information 
about the likelihood of that variant leading to the manifestation of the disease, then genetic 
information cannot and should not be used in the employment setting. And there will always be 
disagreement about how to interpret the science, how to evaluate particular data, and how to 
understand the relative risks associated with particular genes. But under GINA’s broad definition 
of genetic information, employers are prohibited from collecting and using information that is at 
least arguably relevant to an individual’s fitness for a particular position. GINA puts an end to an 
important conversation about genetic information, when society should be engaging with the 
meaning of that information and evaluating if, how, and when it should be used. 
 
 
                                                            
28Miyagawa et al 2008 
29 National Center for Biotechnology Information, “Genes and Disease,”  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK22237/. 
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7.5.3 Litigating Genetic Discrimination 
 
The paucity of litigation over genetic discrimination further supports the view that such 
discrimination is extremely rare, and that GINA is likely to provide potential plaintiffs with few 
new legal tools in those rare circumstances in which they chose to litigate. There are only two 
regularly cited cases related to genetic discrimination. In the first, Norman-Bloodsaw v. 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998), Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, a 
research institution operated jointly by State and Federal agencies, tested unknowing employees 
for syphilis, sickle cell trait, and pregnancy. In its opinion, the court reiterated that “[t]he 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly 
encompasses medical information and its confidentiality.”30  The court acknowledged that “cases 
defining the privacy interest in medical information have typically involved its disclosure to 
“third” parties, rather than the collection of information by illicit means.”31  However, the court 
ultimately held that “it goes without saying that the most basic violation possible involves the 
performance of unauthorized tests--that is, the non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed 
medical information that may be unknown even to plaintiffs.”32 The tests done by Berkeley labs 
were found to violate the Fourth Amendment search and seizure rights as well as the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.33 Without GINA, in other words, the 
Norman-Bloodsaw court was able to remedy an instance of genetic discrimination. 
The second case involving genetic discrimination, Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Railroad Company v. EEOC, was filed on February 9, 2001 by the EEOC; it was the first lawsuit 
filed by the EEOC alleging genetic discrimination under the American’s with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).34 Many commentators claim that the Railroad, in its search for a gene it believed 
contributed to its employees’ carpal tunnel syndrome, conducted tests on asymptomatic 
employees without their knowledge or consent.  In reality, the EEOC never claimed that the 
railroad tested asymptomatic employees.  Instead, the EEOC’s claim involved employees who 
said that they had developed work-related carpal tunnel syndrome and that the railroad had asked 
them to undergo a 34 part medical evaluation, which included a blood test looking for a genetic 
marker. Employees refusing the test claimed that the railroad engaged in retaliatory behavior. 
One employee, for example, claimed to have been threatened with termination for failing to 
submit to the blood test.   
The EEOC alleged that the Railroad’s genetic testing was a violation of the ADA, but 
that theory was never tested because the case was settled. As part of the settlement agreement, 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company paid the EEOC and the Claimants $2.2 million 
and agreed not to conduct genetic testing. The Railroad did not admit fault, and the settlement 
contained a clause stipulating that “The parties agree that this Agreement does not constitute an 
admission by BNSF of any violation of the ADA, or any other anti-discrimination or other 
                                                            
30 Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1269.  
33 Id.  Of course, the Constitution only protects persons from state action. The use of genetic information by health 
insurance companies, plans, researchers and private employers does not raise constitutional problems and was what 
prompted genetic information nondiscrimination legislation.  S. Rep. No. 110-48, at 7.  
34EEOC v Burlington N. Santa Fe Railway Company, Civ No 01-4013 MWB, (N.D. Iowa, Feb. 8, 2001) See Press 
Release, EEOC Settles ADA Suit against BNSF for Genetic Bias, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-
18-01.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (announcing settlement).  
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laws.”35 Although the EEOC’s theory that genetic testing was a violation of the ADA was not 
tested, there is at least a possibility that the ADA can be used to protect Americans from genetic 
discrimination, making additional legislation to prevent genetic discrimination (GINA) 
superfluous.   
Even cases that directly reference GINA provide little evidence that GINA is a valuable legal 
tool. Although the legislation is still quite new, only eight reported cases have mentioned GINA 
since its enactment in 2008.  Six of them were brought under Title II of GINA, while the 
remaining two only tangentially reference the Act. None of the cases were at all dependent upon 
GINA; in the absence of the Act, plaintiffs could (and did) assert their discrimination claims by 
referencing other legal standards. And the six GINA-related claims have not fared well in the 
courts. Three were dismissed for failure to state a claim; one for both failure to state a claim and 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.36 One was filed against the Department of Education 
in Guam and was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The remaining claim brought under GINA 
was dropped by the plaintiff.37 Over time, the situation could change. But at least so far, GINA 
has not served as a useful legal tool for those who believe they have been victims of genetic 
discrimination.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
  
In the absence of evidence that genetic discrimination by insurance companies or employers 
is occurring in the US, it is difficult to justify federal legislation preventing such discrimination.  
Even if genetic discrimination were occurring, it is not clear that GINA is the appropriate 
response.  If discrimination based on genetic information at the hands of insurers were a 
problem, then the prohibition on discrimination should apply to all insurers, not only health 
insurers. GINA also falls short in the workplace; although employment discrimination is clearly 
undesirable, there are some circumstances in which we might want employers to use genetic 
information to ensure that candidates are, and are likely to remain, physically qualified for 
particular positions. In both the insurance and employment settings, it is critical to appreciate the 
difference between unfair discrimination and appropriate distinction. The former bespeaks 
prejudice, bias, and ignorance, the latter a rational response to the different inherent qualities of 
individuals. The border between discrimination and distinction is often blurry, but in the context 
of genetic information it is a line that society must critically engage.  As biobanks continue to 
grow and more genetic information is collected, the threat of genetic discrimination in the US 
will only increase and it will become even more important for society to engage these issues.  
GINA might temporarily serve to assuage fears that people have related to the collection and 
storage of their genetic information by biobanks; however, if genetic discrimination truly 
becomes a problem GINA will not adequately address it.  Ultimately, GINA is a solution in 
search of a problem; it is an unnecessary piece of legislation that creates more problems than it 
                                                            
35 EEOC and BNSF Settle Genetic Testing Case under Americans with Disabilities Act, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-8-02.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (elaborating on settlement 
conditions) 
36 See Bullock v. Spherion, No. 3:10-cv-465, 2011 WL 1869933 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2011); Robinson v. 
Starplex/CMS Event Security, No. CV-10-723-HU, 2011 WL 1541290 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 2011); Citron v. Niche 
Media/Ocean Drive Magazine, No. 10-24014-CIV, 2011 WL 381939 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2011); Benoit v. 
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole-West Division, No. 094047, 2010 WL 481021 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010); 
Capulong v. Dep’t of Education of Guam,  No. 10-00005, 2011 WL 1134986 (D. Guam Mar. 24, 2011).  
37 Armes v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. CCB-11-112, 2011 WL 2471476 (D. Md. June 20, 2011) 
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solves.   
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